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Danube Détente
Romania’s Reconciliation With Hungary After 1996
Tom Gallagher
1 The conflicts in former Yugoslavia have cast a dark shadow over the other countries
watered by the river Danube as it flows between Vienna and the Black sea. Patterns of
trade have been badly disrupted, resulting in huge economic losses that have made the
transition from state-led to market economies even more problem-laden. Prospects for
the consolidation of fragile democracies inevitably dwindle as a result of the added social
hardships as well as the climate of ascendant nationalism. The tendency of neighbouring
states to champion different sides in the conflict, on the basis of longstanding diplomatic,
cultural, or religious links, has also blighted the prospects of regional co-operation.
2 The terrible nature of events in the former Yugoslavia have obscured a long-running
quarrel  between  Romania  and  Hungary  which  strengthened  the  forces  of  radical
nationalism in both countries during the early 1990s.  So bleak were the prospects of
reconciliation  between  two  apparently  estranged  neighbours  that  the  US  Defence
Secretary,  William Perry observed in 1995 that  there had been a  time when he was
concerned about the possibility of an armed conflict between them1. But on 16 September
1996, the leaders of the two countries signed a treaty of friendship which it is hoped will
inaugurate a period of lasting stability between two historic rivals.
3 This  article  analyses  the  changing  conditions  which  have  enabled  two  formerly
intractable neighbours to put aside their quarrels and it examines the obstacles that need
to be overcome before a process of reconciliation can hope to be consolidated.
 
The Roots of Rivalry
4 Romanian-Hungarian rivalry has mainly centred around the position of the 1,6 million
Hungarians living in the majority Romanian province of Transylvania which had been
part of Hungary until 19182. The conflict had disrupted the Warsaw Pact and after 1989
blighted prospects of co-operation around regional security issues to do with economic
recovery and democratisation.
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5 A  breakthrough  in  relations  between  Romania  and  Hungary  occurred  against  the
background of a NATO drive to admit new members as the Atlantic alliance expanded
eastwards.  The timing of the agreement suggests that the prospect of shedding their
isolation  and  becoming  part  of  an  enlarged  European  security  system  is  a  powerful-
enough incentive to enable them to bridge important differences between them.
6 Few inter-state quarrels have been as prolonged and bitter as the one between Romania
and Hungary. The announcement on 14 August 1996 that a treaty was ready to be signed
came after five years of fruitless negotiations and took most observers by surprise. The
significance both sides attribute to the treatment of minorities and to guaranteeing the
status of  the border between the two countries,  has long kept them apart3.  Romania
insisted that any treaty contain a clause whereby Hungary ruled out any peaceful revision
of the frontier ; meanwhile Budapest, while ruling out any forcible border changes, has
declined as long as it perceives that the Hungarian minority in Romania suffers from a
lack of civil rights4.
7 Hungary sees the status and welfare of Hungarian minorities in neighbouring states as a
security issue affecting its  stability.  The largest Hungarian minority is  located in the
Romanian province of Transylvania where it comprises one-quarter of the population5.
This province had been part of Hungary until it was awarded to Romania by the Treaty of
Trianon in 1920.  More frontier revisions,  sponsored by outside powers,  saw it  briefly
return to Hungarian control in 1940-1944 before Romania acquired full sovereignty in the
aftermath of World War II.
8 Post-communist Romania rejected claims that the Hungarian minority, comprising 7,1 %
of the state population (according to the 1992 census) suffered ill-treatment and it did not
disguise its anger whenever Hungary has raised the issue internationally at the UN and
the Council of Europe. The sense of insecurity felt by two states whose borders changed
frequently in the upheavals that convulsed Eastern Europe between 1914 and 1945, has
blocked progress on the signing of the treaty.
9 In many ways, the Romanian-Hungarian dispute is the paradigm case of an inter-ethnic
dispute in Eastern Europe. Before 1918, the ascendant Hungarians used their key position
in the Habsburg empire to try to assimilate ethnic minorities. They pioneered methods
that would be adopted by the successor states that sprang from the Habsburg empire, in
order to create a single national identity in fragile multi-ethnic polities. Communists in
several East European states would of course take Hungarian methods of administrative
centralisation and educational uniformity much further in a bid to erode sub-national
cultures that were deemed to be an obstacle to the socialisation of citizens along Marxist-
Leninist lines. In the 1980s, the minority which bore the brunt of such an assimilation
drive was the Hungarians of Transylvania who adopted forms of passive resistance that
the ethnic Romanians in that province had resorted to a century before in a bid to defend
their language and culture from the inroads of the Magyar state.
10 At inter-state level, a number of restraining factors have ensured that, at least since 1990,
the  Romanian-Hungarian  dispute  centred  on  Transylvania  has  been  conducted  in  a
forceful but non-violent manner :
1. The fear of alienating Western institutions which both countries are anxious to join out of a
common awareness that their respective national interests can best be defended by rapid
amalgamation with Euro-Atlantic economic and security organizations.
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2. Shared nervousness about the conflict until 1995 raging in parts of ex-Yugoslavia and the
potential for a spillover that might cause Romania and Hungary to collide.
3. Awareness that the inter-ethnic quarrel concerning Romania's Hungarian minority is only
the most pressing of several ethnic and territorial problems that both countries face : the
Romanian state finds it difficult to come to terms with the loss of the province of Bessarabia,
seized by the USSR in 1940 and which, in 1991, became the independent state of Moldova ;
relations with the Ukraine are strained because the new former Soviet state contains former
Romanian territory lost at the same time. Meanwhile, Hungarian concerns over the fate of
its co-ethnics in Slovakia and Serbia has resulted in periodic tension with these neighbours.
4. Finally, there is the absence of a military threat as both the armed forces of the states in
dispute are weak in terms of  manpower,  training,  and equipment.  Military co-operation
between the armed forces of Romania and Hungary has actually been the main success story
in  the  stalled  relations  between  these  states  and  the  co-operation  programme  with




11 There is no doubt that the high-level concern of leading Western governments and NATO
over  the  security  crisis  affecting  ex-Yugoslavia  and  its  neighbours  has  given  much-
needed impetus to improving bilateral ties between two historically estranged Danubian
states.  The  growing  degree  of  interest  in  the  stability  of  former  communist  states
bordering ex-Yugoslavia is of recent duration and may only enjoy a limited lifespan. It
largely stems from the US-inspired bid to end the conflict in Bosnia which culminated in
the Dayton Accord of November 1995. The need to isolate nationalist hardliners in Bosnia
and  promote  moderate  forces  capable  of  arranging  compromises  across  the  various
ethnic divides was at the centre of the strategy identified with Richard Holbrooke, former
US assistant secretary of state.
12 The architects of the Dayton Accord realise that the success or failure of the initiative
depends,  in  part,  on  efforts  to  delegitimise  conflictual  nationalism in  South-Eastern
Europe as a whole. But previous Western initiatives, limited though they were, do not
offer hopeful precedents. Little now remains, for instance, of the Stability Pact, promoted
by the French Premier Edouard Balladur in 1994-1995, and designed to reduce inter-state
nationality conflicts involving countries hoping to join the EU. It ceased to be a reference-
point for preventing nationalist quarrels undermining European security once Balladur's
challenge for the French Presidency ended in defeat. His efforts to induce Romania and
Hungary  to  settle  their  differences  before  the  March 1995  conference  launching the
Stability Pact, met with failure6.
 
The Catalyst of NATO Expansion
13 The Stability Pact foundered because it lacked concrete incentives that would persuade
East European states to put longstanding ethnic quarrels behind them. However, when
the North Atlantic  Ministerial  Council  announced at the end of  1995 that  NATO was
prepared  to  consider  applications  for  full  membership  from  former  Warsaw  Pact
countries, a new situation arose. The prospect of becoming part of an enlarged Western
defence  umbrella  was  an  attractive  one  and  both  Romania  and  Hungary  submitted
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applications in the spring of 1996. However, from the outset officials from NATO and its
leading  members  insisted  that  they  were  not  interested  in  having  as  new members
countries that were in dispute with their neighbours. The poisonous feud between two
unfriendly NATO “allies”, Greece and Turkey, cast a very long shadow and there was no
desire  to  be  burdened  by  fresh  bilateral  quarrels  bound  to  diminish  the  alliance's
effectiveness.
14 The procession of officials from NATO states visiting Romania and Hungary in 1996 were
careful  not to make statements that  apportioned blame for the deadlock over treaty
negotiations or to talk up the chances of one candidate at the expense of the other. US
Secretary of State, William Perry and Javier Solana, the NATO Secretary-General, on visits
to  Bucharest  in  1995  and  1996  respectively,  praised  efforts  made  by  Romania  in
harmonising military standards with NATO. But Perry emphasised that NATO applicants
must settle outstanding disputes with neighbours in order to be seriously considered for
entry and Secretary-General Solana, on the eve of a visit to Romania in May 1996, urged
the government to make more of an effort to strengthen the rights of ethnic minorities7.
Hitherto, the Romanian government – together with most opposition parties – had seen
the treatment of ethnic minorities as a broadly internal matter not to be considered in
relations between states.
15 A  candidate  nation’s  chances  of  joining  NATO  depended  on  its  performance  in
democratising  its  society,  reforming  its  economy,  settling  differences  with  adjacent
states, and restructuring its military in accordance with Western standards. In terms of
the stability of its democratic system, its economic progress, and its relations with other
countries in the region, Romania's credentials for NATO membership, were weaker than
most  other  applicants.  The  country's  political  system  displays  growing  oligarchical
tendencies  and mounting economic and social  difficulties  are  being faced in what  is
proving to be a protracted transition from communism. Above all, the failure of bilateral
treaty negotiations with the Ukraine and Russia, and the delay in normalising relations
with Moldova (much of which had been ruled from Bucharest in the inter-war years), are
likely to suggest to wary NATO planners that Romania might be a consumer of security,




16 The reform process in Hungary is undoubtedly stronger on most civil  fronts than in
Romania. The Socialist-Liberal coalition government of Gyula Horn, elected in May 1994,
managed  in  1995  to  sign  a  bilateral  treaty  with  Slovakia  where  the  second  largest
Hungarian minority is located. The Horn government is seen as far more pragmatic on
minority issues than its conservative nationalist predecessors. However, in July 1996 the
palpable  sense  of  complacency  in  Budapest  about  the  steady  progress  Hungary  was
making  towards  admission to  NATO in  the  first  round of  expansion,  was  dashed by
adverse Western reaction to a declaration signed by the Hungarian government which
contained  a  certain  amount  of  rhetorical  nationalism  hitherto  associated  with  the
1990-1993 government of Jozsef Antall.
17 On 5 July, a summit of Hungary’s ethnic minorities issued a declaration, together with the
Horn government, in which it was stated that the survival of Hungarian communities
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outside the state could only be assured by “autonomy” and “self-government”9. The US
State Department reacted on 29 July by saying that it rejected the concept of territorial
autonomy on an ethnic basis  and that it  presumed the Budapest  declaration did not
represent  any  change  in  the  Hungarian  government’s  policy.  More  forthright  was
Congressman Charles H. Smith, chairman of the US Congress's Helsinki Committee who,
on  2  August  complained  that  the  participants  of  the  Budapest  summit  concerned
themselves with « ambiguous support for autonomy » and « self-government », knowing
that the use of these terms must « induce alarm in countries which are already afraid of
alleged irredentism »10.
18 Budapest  could  not  afford  to  take  such  criticism  lightly.  Smith  is  one  of  the  few
Congressional  experts  on  South-Eastern  Europe  and  he  has  a  proven  record  of
impartiality. He had lobbied hard against the US government's decision in June to grant
Most Favoured Nation trading status on a permanent basis to Romania on account of
what he saw as the continuing influence of neo-communist thinking at the upper levels of
government.  The  Romanian’s  naturally  drew  comfort  from  Budapest's  discomfiture
President  Ion  Iliescu  declaring  that  « Hungary  and  NATO  are  going  to  enter  NATO
together or not at all »11. Hitherto Hungary had dismissed such statements as groundless.
It had also been unmoved by statements emanating from the Romanian, defence Minister,
Gheorghe Tinca, about the security risks that would entail if a new partition line was
drawn in a part of Europe already full of volatility12.
19 Whether it realised it or not, the Hungarian government's endorsement of the Budapest
declaration gave some external credibility to Romanian fears and thus strengthened the
bargaining position of the Bucharest government. Having said in June that it did not see
the  point  in  resuming  treaty  negotiations  until  after  Romanian  elections  due  in
November,  the  Horn  government  made  a  volte-face and  resumed  negotiations  on  11
August. Three days later it was announced that the text of a bilateral treaty had been
« practically finalised » and that the treaty could be signed in mid-September13.
20 Compromise had been reached over the Council of Europe's Recommendation 1201 on
minorities  which  hitherto  Romania  had  refused  (unlike  Slovakia)  to  write  into  the
bilateral  treaty with Hungary because of  fear that  it  might be seen as giving formal
approval for the idea of political autonomy for minorities. But Bucharest withdrew its
objection as long as it was made clear that the joint interpretation of 1201 should neither
refer to collective rights, nor force the two sides to grant any autonomy status on ethnic
grounds14.
21 It is already clear that the prize of being inside the Western military umbrella and the
alternative of isolation, concentrated the minds of two intractable neighbours hitherto
unable to bridge their differences. The exact role of the West in promoting a settlement
remains unclear, but it was far from negligible and the US State Department was active in
the weeks before the breakthrough was announced15.
 
Domestic Agenda Promote A Settlement
22 Domestic  pressures  were  also  important  in  closing  the  gap  between  the  two  sides,
particularly  in  the  case  of  Romania.  President  Iliescu  and  the  ruling  party,  Partidul
Democraţiei Sociale din România (Party of Romanian Social Democracy in Romania, PDSR)
were preparing for presidential and parliamentary elections on 3 November 1996. The
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PDSR had done badly in local elections in June on account of its economic record and
persistent allegations of corruption among top officials.  The reformist opposition had
profited from widespread disenchantment over falling living standards and government
mishandling of the economy to take the lead in opinion polls. No electoral contender is
plausibly able to offer better economic times for Romanians who face more years of
retrenchment before the economy can recover from the colossal policy errors and waste
of resources that occurred in the Ceauşescu era. But the President and his supporters feel
that successes on the foreign policy front can enable the PDSR to regain the political
initiative.
23 The  post-communist  regime  in  Romania  has  struggled  hard  to  acquire  international
respectability. The communist background of much of the post-1989 leadership and the
controversial methods used to acquire power in 1990 made Romania a pariah state in the
eyes of major Western governments until its usefulness in containing the conflict in the
former Yugoslavia brought a change of heart in the West. Despite his communist pedigree
and residual authoritarianism, President Iliescu was broadly viewed as genuine in wishing
to align Romania firmly with the West. The wish to “rejoin Europe” is overwhelmingly
popular among Romanians, 95 % in a Eurobarometer poll of March 1996 supporting NATO
entry, no other East European state registering such a degree of public enthusiasm16. In
actively pursuing admission to NATO, securing preferential trading links with the USA,
and  improving  ties  with  Hungary,  the  government  was  broadly  in  line  with  public
opinion.
24 Midway through its  term,  the left-leaning Horn government in Hungary also needed
foreign policy successes to compensate for a faltering performance at home. A failure to
revive  the  stagnant  Hungarian  economy  and  controversy  over the  conduct  of
privatisation schemes has provoked government disunity and a slump in its popularity.
The clinching of an agreement with Romania would be the clearest affirmation of Premier
Horn's desire for a historic reconciliation with Hungary's neighbours which had proverb
such  a  popular  electoral  issue  for  him  in  1994.  In  its  preoccupation  with  minority
questions, the Antall government had often appeared more concerned with non-citizens
than with its own voters17. The conservative government of the Hungarian Democratic
Forum (HDF) had over-estimated the concern felt in Hungary for the three million co-
ethnics to be found in neighbouring countries by emphasising that Hungary's relations
with these states would be largely determined by their record on minority rights. The
Antall government endorsed the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the 1990 Treaty of Paris
which ruled out the revision of European frontiers by force while refusing to deny the
possibility of peaceful frontier revisions at some future date18. Bilateral co-operation with
Hungary on defence matters and trade continued against a frosty background in which
the two countries scored points against each other at international events and launched
initiatives seen as unfriendly by the other side19.
25 At times, nationalist statements from government officials in Budapest proved distinctly
unhelpful  for their co-ethnics in Romania.  In 1992 the position of  the Hungarians in
Transylvania was weakened by a statement from the defence minister of Hungary, Janos
Für who declared that the safeguarding of Hungarians everywhere is inseparable from
the security  of  his  nation and the Hungarian government  and parliament  should do
everything in their power, using all legal and diplomatic means, to end the threat to the
minority and to guarantee their survival20. This ill-judged statement, coming on the eve
of  the  Romanian  local  elections,  ensured  victory  in  a  tightly-fought  contest  for  the
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hardline nationalist, Gheorghe Funar who, as mayor of the city of Cluj, has directed his
fire against the Hungarian minority and done serious damage to inter-ethnic and inter-
state  relations  by virtue of  his  Partidul  Unitaţii  Naţionale  Române  (Party of  Romanian
National Unity, PUNR) being in the ruling coalition from 1994 to 199621. It is not the first,
nor will it be the last time, that hardliners on opposite sides of an ethnic dispute have
rendered this kind of service to one another.
26 Premier  Horn  has  worked  to  undo  the  mistakes  of  Hungarian  foreign  policy  by
disavowing Antall's 1990 statement that he was Prime Minister “in spirit” of 15 million
Hungarians, (that is including those in neighbouring states) and by making it clear that
he had no lingering attachment towards revising the Trianon settlement even by peaceful
means. His economic failures have enabled the opposition parties to promote nationalism
but the government in Budapest has freedom to manoeuvre in the way that it approaches
the minority question and defines ties with neighbouring states. Irredentist sentiment is
weak  in  Hungary  and,  thanks  to  the  communist  authorities  hostility  to  displays  of
nationalism, the generations born after 1945 often display little interest in, or awareness
of, the situation of the minorities.
 
The Nationalist Temptation in Romania
27 Co-operation between Horn and Iliescu was made easier by the fact that both are ex-
communists with a reputation as pragmatists within their liberal and despotic pre-1989
authoritarian political systems. As foreign minister during the violent overthrow of the
Ceauşescu  regime,  Horn  rendered  Iliescu  valuable  assistance  as  he  sought  to  gain
international recognition.  for his de facto Frontul  Salvării  Nationâle (National Salvation
Front,  FSN)22.  President  Iliescu  faced  more  constraints  given  the  higher  profile
nationalism enjoys in Romanian political culture : the ruling PDSR had been dependent
on  the  support  of  ultra-nationalist  parties  during  the  lifetime  of  the  Văcăroiu
government (1992-1996) and the reformist opposition had become mildly nationalistic in
a  bid  to  defeat  its  rival  at  the  polls23.  Although  the  strength  of  post-communist
nationalism  in  Romania  springs  from  a  sense  of  insecurity,  nationalism  was  also
discreetly promoted by Iliescu and his entourage in order to deny to the opposition such
a valuable political card.
28 Iliescu has usually refrained from making crude nationalist statements but he shares one
important feature with the chauvinist bloc :  he has no interest in replacing a passive
political culture in which a low value is placed on participation with an active one in
which voters are able to create the autonomous space necessary for genuine pluralism to
flourish24. The ultra-nationalist parties which the government promoted to eat into the
opposition's  support  in  Transylvania,  eventually  escaped  from  central  control  and,
thanks to their extremism, they did serious damage to Romania’s international image
during the early 1990s. The government shoved its own latent nationalism by building
alliances with parties well-known for their anti-semitism and nostalgia for Ceauşescu's
brand of national communism. A protocol was even signed in January 1995 between the
ruling PDSR and the Jew-baiting Greater Romania Party, the anti-Hungarian PUNR, and
the leftist Socialist Workers Party which placed Romania in the unenviable position of
being the only government in eastern Europe dependent on such extremist movements25.
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29 The  ascendancy  of  extremist  parties  which  were  soon  busy  inserting  supporters  in
important ministries and sensitive local positions has not helped inter-ethnic relations.
But there has been no repeat of the violent clashes between Romanians and Hungarians
in the city of Tirgu Mureş during March 1990 which first revealed that nationalist hatreds
had not perished with the dictatorship. Indeed, thanks to the patient work of NGOs such
as the Pro-Europe League committed to ethnic co-existence, community relations have
recovered  in  a  city  shared  almost  equally  by  the  two  main  ethnic  groups26.  In
Transylvania generally,  Romanians and Hungarians often are suspicious and at  times
anxious about the political intentions of leaders from the other community, but there is
not usually the hate or permanent distrust that can disfigure everyday life in other zones
of majority-minority conflict in the region. The Transylvanian paradox is that several
elected officials  and government  appointees  have been stirring up antagonism while
relations between Romanians and Hungarians on the ground are virtually free of tension
except in the city of Cluj and, elsewhere on emotive days of the year. But there is always
the danger that local disputes over the use of bilingual signs or the erection of statues to
Romanian nationalists, may trigger off unrest that has reverberations at inter-state level
between Romania and Hungary.
30 Romania  offered a  study in  ambiguity  between 1992 and 1996 :  it  was  committed to
integration with European institutions and to replacing the command economy with a
hybrid but basically market-led one. However, at the same time the ruling party has made
a  series  of tactical  alliances  with  ultra-nationalists  (which  would  be  recognised  as
appropriate in Serbia) to control what is proving to be a lengthy and, in some ways,
qualified transition from national communism. If a sharper boundary had been drawn
between the government and ultra-nationalist  parties which have never gained more
than 12 to 15 per cent of the Romanian vote, it is likely that a state treaty with Hungary
could have been signed much earlier than this.
 
Treaty Pressurises Hungarian Minority
31 Predictably most extreme nationalists have denounced Iliescu for allegedly selling out to
Budapest.  But,  ultimately,  it  may  be  the  Hungarian  minority  which  finds  the  treaty
hardest to swallow. Since 1990, Uniunea Democrată Maghiară din România (the Democratic
Union  of  Hungarians  in  Romania,  UDMR)  has  been  the  recognised  voice  of  most
Hungarian  voters.  It  firmly  rejects  separatism,  knowing  that  this  wildly  unrealistic
objective finds little favour with Romania's Hungarians most of whom live far from the
border with Hungary, much of the territory in between being inhabited overwhelmingly
by Romanians. But it demands wide-ranging autonomy which has placed it out on a limb
in Romanian politics.
32 It is not always easy to determine what form of autonomy the UDMR wants as its various
pronouncements are open to differing interpretations,  which gives its enemies useful
ammunition. But this much is clear : the UDMR believes that the interests of Hungarians
in Romania can only be properly defended by territorial autonomy for areas in which
Hungarians  constitute  a  majority  and  personal  autonomy,  with  an  emphasis  on
safeguarding cultural identity, in areas where the population is more dispersed27.  The
UDMR's  stance  was  radicalised  at  its  1995  congress  as  a  result  of  the  Văcăroiu's
government growing links with Romanian extremists  and following the failure of  its
electoral alliance with the reformist opposition to bring its goals any nearer28.
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33 Compared with most Romanian parties, the UDMR is a professional, well-organized force
which practices a high degree of internal democracy and is able to rely on a high turnout
of Hungarian voters at elections. The UDMR’s current effectiveness may stem from the
fact that the Hungarian minority was involved in building a Hungarian state down to
1918.  This  distinguishes  it  from  most  other  stateless  minorities  in  the  region  in
opposition to national states.
34 The 1991 Romanian constitution is opposed by the UDMR because it defines Romania as a
national state. The party fears that this could be used as the basis for denying Hungarians
a separate cultural identity29.  One law which provoked strong resistance was the 1995
Education law which is condemned for greatly restricting access to higher education in
the Hungarian language. The UDMR fears that this law will encourage the slow motion
assimilation of  the Hungarian minority by obliging the brightest  young people to go
abroad for their university education. In 1995, it gathered almost 500 000 signatures in
less than two months for a petition against the bill. This demonstrated, according to two
liberal  Romanian  analysts,  that  « the  party  represented  the  will  of  the  Hungarian
minority  in  Romania »30.  But  much of  Romanian  opinion  sees  the  party’s  mobilising
campaign  as  a  potential  threat  to  the  territorial  sovereignty  of  the  country.  The
nationalist  bloc  of  parties  wants  it  banned outright  while  even a  well-known liberal
commentator like Alina Mungiu suspects that the insistence on cultural autonomy... is a
sign that « the Hungarian elite in Romania is preparing for eventual secession », albeit of
a peaceful kind more akin to the aims of many French speakers in Quebec than non-Serbs
in former Yugoslavia31.
35 The  UDMR's  model  for  an  enduring  ethnic  settlement  in  Romania  is  the  significant
autonomy granted to the German-speaking minorities living in Italy's South Tyrol which
has been the basis for Austro-Italian reconciliation. The Romanian political elite prefers
the model of Franco-German reconciliation which involved an accommodation at state
level between two historic rivals and was not based on the redress of minority grievances.
Indeed in 1995 President Iliescu proposed that Romania and Hungary followed such a
model when negotiations between the two states had become stalled32.
36 The UDMR fears the Franco-German model  citing the fate of  the Alsatian population
which it feels has been subject to assimilation from Paris. However, it was not consulted
by the Horn government about the basis  of  the agreement reached with Romania in
August 1996 and the UDMR was rebuffed when it requested a meeting with the Hungarian
premier to express its concerns about the absence of any reference to the collective rights
the Hungarian minority in the draft of the proposed treaty. But the Horn government can
afford to turn a deaf ear to the UDMR as it strives to enhance Hungary’s prospects of
being  within a  new  European  security  umbrella :  the  UDMR  only  possesses  moral
influence and not electoral clout in Hungarian state politics and it is most unlikely to turn
to extremism given its attachment to constitutional politics.
 
A Peaceful Change of Regime in 1996
37 The Romanian-Hungarian treaty meant that the Romanian election campaign, though
fiercely fought, was the first one since 1989 that was largely free of nationalist rancour.
The two main opposition alliances, Convenţia Democraţică Româna (Romanian Democratic
Convention, CDR) and Uniunea Social Democrata (Social Democratic Union, USD) won an
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outright majority in the parliamentary elections of 3 November 1996. They rallied behind
the presidential candidacy of Emil Constantinescu who defeated the incumbent on 17
November. Iliescu was rejected because he had reneged on promises of social protection,
especially  to  urban workers,  corruption was  too  omnipresent  to  conceal  from many
former  supporters,  and  the  Văcăroiu  government  had  become  a  byword  for
administrative  incompetence33.  Millions  of  ex-Iliescu  voters  had  acquired  their  own
agenda for change and were ceasing to be reliant on a paternalistic and flawed leader.
The generally-incident free election campaign suggested that Romanian political culture
was beginning to outgrow the Balkan stereotype dominated by images of partisanship,
collectivist values, and nationalism34.
38 The new President's choice to head the government was Victor Ciorbea, a 42-year-old
lawyer from Transylvania who soon showed a strong personal commitment to improving
ties with the Hungarian minority. In speeches, diplomatic initiatives, and approaches to
the Hungarian minority,  Romania's new rulers offered a new definition of patriotism
which public opinion responded well to. President Constantinescu made it clear that he
saw the chief threats to Romanian national sovereignty as being internal rather than
external in origin. He saw the need to abandon the post-communist strategy involving
« the political instrumentalization of myths, religious fundamentalism skilfully used for
political ends, isolation and other aggressive discourses »35.
39 The political marginalisation of the Hungarian minority ended when two members of the
UDMR joined the Christian Democrats (PNTCD), the Liberals, and the Democratic Party
(PD) in the government of Victor Ciorbea. A development which would have been seen as
novel and shocking only a short time before soon passed without notice and gave rise to
no adverse reaction from Romanian society. The image of Romanians and Hungarians as
insiders  and outsiders  locked in  a  majority-minority  power  relationship was  given a
powerful dent.  The prospects for inter-ethnic co-operation appeared promising since,
joining the two Hungarians in the government, was Gavril Dejeu of the PNTCD, the new
minister of the interior. In 1940, he had been orphaned at the age of 8 when his father
was killed by occupying Hungarian troops, but he refused to be the prisoner of a tragic
history and the determination to bury a divisive past soon became a hallmark of the
reformist coalition36.
40 The role of the Romanian state in dealing with ethnic diversity was re-assessed in the first
half of 1997 ; in May the government amended the educational and local administration
laws, giving minorities the right to be schooled in their mother tongue at all levels as well
as  the  right  to  use  their  language  in  court  and  in  the  local  administration.  The
government had already published plans to introduce bilingual signs in areas of minority
settlement and a Hungarian consulate was to be opened in Cluj in the summer. These
measures  produced  no  public  outcry  and  even  the  nationalist  parties  and  the  PDSR
initially found it hard to rouse their supporters to protest in large numbers.
41 The rapprochement between neighbours and historic rivals was marked by a series of
high-level visits. Adrian Severin, the new Romanian foreign minister, paid his first official
visit abroad to Hungary at the end of 1996. Hungary's backing for Romanian entry into
NATO was confirmed and a range of initiatives to strengthen defence and economic co-
operation  were  announced.  In  his  March  1997  visit  to  Budapest,  Premier  Ciorbea
emphasized the importance of economic and military co-operation. He made it clear that
he hoped to benefit from Hungarian investment and its greater experience of market
economics in order to relaunch the Romanian economy37. This marked a change from the
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Iliescu era when the government was reluctant to encourage investment from Hungary.
Nationalist parties viewed such investment as tantamount to the re-colonization of the
country and had discouraged it in parts of Transylvania where they enjoyed influence.
But when Hungary's President, Arpad Goncz paid a state visit to Romania from 25-27 May
1997,  he  found that  there  were 800 companies  with mixed capital  drawn from both
countries operating in the Tirgu Mureş area alone38.
42 Premier  Ciorbea  shared  a  strong  personal  commitment  to  improving  Romanian-
Hungarian  ties  at  the  human  level.  He  spoke  about  his  own  friendly  contacts  with
Hungarians  at  school,  university  and  while  serving  in  the  army.  He  established  a
precedent by sending greetings to Hungarians in Romania celebrating their national day
on  15  March  and  by  allowing  state  officials  to  participate  in  the  festivities39.  The
significance of the gesture is clear when recalling the historical events in questions.
43 The Hungarians were commemorating the 1848 revolution led by Louis Kossuth who had
refused to recognise the existence of  a  Romanian nation in Transylvania.  Conflicting
nationalists  neutralised each other's  bid  for  freedom in  a  territory  in  revolt  against
imperial rule. Avram Iancu, the leader of the Romanian 1848ers in Transylvania appealed
to the Hungarians « to understand that weapons can never decide between you and us.
Fate put us in a homeland so that together we can strive to improve it and enjoy the
results »40. 150 years later, Ciorbea's bid to carry fellow Romanians with him as fences
were mended with Hungary and its co-ethnics living in Romania, were strengthened by
the fact that he came from Iancu's locality in the Apuseni mountains, still viewed as a
cradle of Romanian nationalism.
44 But foresight and tact are needed in defusing sensitive inter-ethnic issues otherwise the
good intended can be lost. If a reminder of this axiom was needed, it was provided in
March  1997  when  Prime  Minister  Ciorbea  outlined  a  two-stage  process  whereby  a
Hungarian section would be established at Babes-Bolyai university in Cluj followed by the
creation of a separate Hungarian language university41.
45 Ciorbea's proposal was condemned outright by the left-nationalist bloc of parties, but it
also divided opinion within Cluj's main university. Hitherto, the university had played a
moderating  role  during the  nationalist  tensions  provoked by  the  city's  controversial
mayor.  But  one  pro-rector  threatened  to  resign  while  another  backed  the  right  of
Hungarians  to  their  own  university ;  Romanian  and  Hungarian  student  associations
adopted  different  positions ;  significantly,  the  Cluj  branches  of  the  main  parties  in
government soon expressed their unhappiness about Ciorbea's move42.
46 The conflict management procedures adopted in order to gain acceptance for changes in
one  of  the  most  sensitive  questions  in  relations  between  the  two  Transylvanian
communities would be vital for success. But little skill was displayed by the government
as  it  took  a  new initiative  in  such  a  sensitive  field.  Ciorbea  took  his  stand  without
consulting the university's rector, Andrei Marga whom he would normally consider an
ally because of his commitment to human rights and inter-ethnic tolerance. The
government may have decided that  a process of  prior consultation would mobilise a
coalition opposed to the Hungarian university. However, its haste and failure to prepare
public opinion left the government isolated. A retreat was then announced : after meeting
with university leaders President Constantinescu announced that one university would
survive but with Romanian and Hungarian sections. Eventually, on 21 October 1997, on
the  occasion  of  the  Hungarian  Prime  Minister's  visit  to  Bucharest,  the  Romanian
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government expressed its willingness to see a Hungarian language university founded in
Transylvania43.
47 The mishandling of the Cluj university question did little damage to the government.
Until the summer of 1997 public opinion displayed strong confidence in the ambitious
economic  strategy  intended  to  relaunch  the  moribund  state-led  economy  through
sweeping privatisation measures and a sharp cut in state subsidies for the politically
influential but economically doomed heavy industry sector. Support for Ciorbea's shock-
therapy plans, which included the liberalisation of prices for all foodstuffs and energy
products was high, despite the adverse affect it was already having on the purchasing
power of the average consumer44. There was also much hope that the enormous time and
effort the new government had invested in promoting Romania’s NATO bid would result
in Romania being invited to join at the Alliance's Madrid summit on 8-9 July.
48 But the six months of frenetic reforms were insufficient to make up for the six years
“lost” under Iliescu and the PDSR. Hungary's bid to join NATO was accepted but Romania
was  informed  that  it  would  have  to  re-apply  in  the  next  round  of  expansion.
Constantinescu had prepared public opinion for the rebuff in June by warning that the
pace of economic reform was proving a hindrance to Romania's admission chances45. An
opinion poll in late May showed that 29 % of voters blamed the PDSR for any failure of
Romania's NATO bid compared with 16 % holding the Ciorbea government responsible46.
There was little noticeable public anger that Hungary had been selected and Romania
spurned.
49 President  Clinton  tried  to  assuage  disappointment  by  paying  an  8-hour  visit  top
Bucharest on 11 July where he declared that « the door to NATO is open, will stay open,
and we will help you pass through it »47. If nothing else, this visit showed that Washington
felt it important to provide top-level support to Romania's reformers, perhaps out of a
belief that their success could have a stabilising influence in South-Eastern-Europe as a
whole.
50 In retrospect, it appears that Romania's high-profile campaign to join NATO in 1997 was
in no small measure connected with the need to preserve unity within a fragile coalition
and  contain  popular  discontent  about  poorly-applied  attempts  to  restructure  the
economy on a  competitive  basis.  In  the  weeks  following  the  Madrid  summit,  it  was
striking how the Ciorbea government found itself thrown on to the defensive as a result
of  coalition  wrangles,  hesitation  about  applying  radical  economic  measures,  and the
failure to spearhead a firm anti-corruption campaign which had been one of the promises
that had initially boosted its popularity.
 
Nationalist Revival
51 With Iliescu's PDSR in even more disarray, it was the ultra-nationalist parties that were
best-placed to exploit the government's difficulties. In the second half of 1997, they were
able to exploit inter-ethnic controversies that were relatively minor ones compared with
the Cluj university question and the inclusion of Hungarians in the government. In Cluj
Mayor  Funar  won  fresh  publicity  and  broke  the  law  by  having  the  Hungarian  flag
removed from the newly-opened Hungarian consulate in the city48.  The closure of an
orphanage  containing  mainly  Romanian  children  in  the  UDMR-controlled  town  of
Odorhei Secuiesc, led to claims that the welfare of the Romanian minority in Hungarian-
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dominated  areas  was  in  jeopardy  because  of  arbitrary  UDMR  officials49.  Finally,  the
decision by some UDMR councils to erect bilingual signs before the relevant law had been
passed in parliament, gave rise to ill-feeling in parts of Transylvania which nationalists
were able to exploit.
52 The credibility of the most extreme of the nationalist politicians, Corneliu Vadim Tudor,
leader of the Greater Romania Party (PRM) was boosted when the PDSR formed a working
alliance with his and other nationalist formations. Indeed Tudor upstaged Iliescu at the
PDSR's own conference on 21 June 1997 ; he was acclaimed by the audience and Iliescu
warmly welcomed on to the podium a man who, just a year before, had accused the then
Romanian President of being an agent of the KGB50.
53 Iliescu may well come to regret entering into such a Mephistophelian pact. Hitherto he
had always claimed to be equidistant between the claims of the UDMR and its Romanian
chauvinist opponents.  The pact brought the PDSR few rewards ;  in Bucharest autumn
rallies protesting about government policies were poorly attended. Nationalist issues
failed to persuade southerners to take to the streets. But in Transylvania, public protests
emphasising claims that the government was capitulating to Hungarian interests received
a much better turnout.  Tudor overtook Iliescu in the popularity stakes arid the PRM
jumped to 11 % in the opinion polls nearly three times what it had received in the 1996
election51.
54 It  had been widely assumed that the association of the nationalist  bloc with dubious
financial projects (the Caritas pyramid scheme and the failed Dacia Felix bank) and its
rampant careerism, had marginalised the chauvinists parties for a considerable period52.
But a lot of discontented voters seemed prepared to forgive the nationalists their sins,
especially  since  there  was  no  other  part  of  the  opposition  able  to  articulate  their
complaints about the government.
55 More worrying was the tendency of mainstream newspapers to adopt an increasingly
anti-Hungarian stance. Naţional, a new Bucharest daily launched in the summer of 1997
by  Ion  Cristoiu  the  doyen  of  Romanian  tabloid  journalism,  compared the  Ciorbea
government's concessions to Hungarians with the ones made by the communists in their
early  years  of  power53.  Adevârul,  the  chief  newspaper  of  record  in  Romania,  was
particularly strident. Its editorial of 21 October 1997, coinciding with a visit to Romania
by the Hungarian Premier, accused the government of making numerous concessions to
Hungarian interests without receiving a single thing in return. A battle for circulation in
times of falling purchasing power among readers partly explains why the mainstream
press is ready to flirt with chauvinism. The longstanding tendency for Romanian opinion
formers to seek a foreign excuse for domestic misfortunes may also shed light on press
behaviour at this time.
56 Gyorgy Frunda, the UDMR presidential candidate in the 1996 elections, had warned early
in 1997 that « if things go wrong [for the government], it is the Hungarians who are going
to be blamed »54. The Ciorbea government declined to mount an energetic defence of its
minority  policies  or  refute  nationalist  claims  that  it  was  retreating  in  the  face  of
unacceptable Hungarian demands. This lethargy contrasted with the promise which both
the Romanian and Hungarian Presidents had made in Cluj on 27 May 1997 when they said
that « we will not allow any extremist minorities in Romania or Hungary to speak on
behalf of our people »55. That promise was easier to fulfil in Hungary where the right-
wing opposition has reluctantly thrown, its support behind the détente with Romania,
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realising  how  popular  it  is  with  Hungarian  voters.  But  in  Romania  the  attempt  to
integrate the Hungarian minority into the Romanian body politic by removing many of its
grievances has so far found few eloquent defenders ; the government was even afraid to
move against Mayor Funar in Cluj after he was deposed in March as leader of his own
party.  The  provocative  actions  which  had  been  his  trademark  in  the  Iliescu  years
continued unimpeded. The Cluj prefect (a Bucharest appointee) said in October 1997 that
the system of justice and local administration, remained in the hands of Cluj nationalists56
. This was a tacit admission that the government simply lacked the authority to bring the
mayor to heal.
57 Inter-ethnic  tensions  have  also  surfaced  within  the Ciorbea  government  (along  with
many other types as its own belief in its abilities to carry through radical reforms has
declined). In July 1997, a majority of Senators from Ciorbea's party, the Partidul Naţional
Ţărănesc-Creştin,  Democrat  Christian  Democrats  (National  Peasant  and  Christian
Democratic Party, PNTCD), opposed the modification of the 1995 education law which
would have allowed the subjects of history and geography to be taught in Hungarian in
state schools in minority areas57. The UDMR, in its turn, threatened to withdraw from the
government  unless  it  pushed  through  the  educational  law  revision  by  emergency
ordinance58. This would avoid the need for a parliamentary vote which the government
might have lost because of the opposition of PNTCD members. The UDMR demand was
met but it led to ill-feeling with its coalition partners.
58 Internal party politics can explain why such rigid positions are adopted. Many PNTCD
senators opposed to Hungarian claims fear the loss of their seats to ultra-nationalists or
else look for ways of advancing their claims inside a party whose leadership is dominated
by aged survivors of Romanian prison camps. Similarly, in advance of the UDMR's fifth
congress held in October 1997, the party's moderate leadership needed to show resolution
on the education question in order to isolate radicals around Bishop Laszlo Tokes who
think the party has sold its parliamentary votes too cheaply. But the demands of party
politics can have an unsettling affect on public opinion where sensitive ethnic questions
are concerned. At least a clear majority in the UDMR is aware that no future government
is  likely  to  be  so  favourable  to  Hungarian  interests  as  the  Ciorbea  one,  however
disappointing  its  legislative  record.  The  UDMR  congress  avoided  inflammatory
statements or motions and it went largely unnoticed in the Romanian press which only
tends to give detailed attention to the UDMR when it behaves in ways that are seen to
correspond to certain negative stereotypes.
 
Conclusion
59 The impetus for the 1996 bilateral treaty came from the West, in particular from the USA.
Following  the  1995  Dayton  Agreement  the  USA  saw  the  need  to  persevere  with
confidence-building strategies in South-Eastern Europe where, hitherto, it had been wary
of  deep  involvements.  When  NATO  invited  former  Warsaw  Pact  states  to  apply  for
membership,  the  Iliescu regime found that  the  rewards  for  burying its  quarrel  with
Hungary, in terms of collective security and greater integration with western institutions,
outweighed any domestic benefits to be obtained from manipulating an ancient rivalry
for electoral purposes.
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60 The Iliescu regime's  residual  authoritarianism,  nationalist  character,  and reliance  on
office-holders whose influence can be traced back to the pre-1989 hardline communist
era, meant that it displayed certain neo-communist mentalities. But unlike states like
Serbia  or  Belarus,  still  dominated  by  former  high-ranking  communists  disdainful  of
democracy,  Romania  has  shown  enthusiasm for  sheltering  under  a  western  security
umbrella. The policy was, and is, hugely popular with an electorate deeply suspicious of
Russia and disenchanted by the economic failures of the Iliescu regime.
61 Iliescu may also have felt that it would still be possible for Romania to ignore onerous
conditions of NATO membership, such as the commitment to building democracy, just as
Portugal,  Turkey  and  Spain,  had  previously  done.  His  opportunistic  approach  to
reconciliation with Hungary and the state's Hungarian minority was shown during the
1996 election campaign when he exploited chauvinist sentiments in a failed bid to get re-
elected. The new regime, shaped by the alliance of President Constantinescu and Premier
Victor Ciorbea is undoubtedly more genuine in its willingness to honour the 1996 treaty
and  turn  it  into  a  platform  for  meaningful  reconciliation.  This  was  a  totally  new
departure as Frunda, the ethnic Hungarian leader, noted : « from 1918 till now no leading
figure in Romanian politics ever had the courage to say “ let us normalise relations with
Hungary ” »59.
62 But under pro-western reformers, the pace of reconciliation is still determined by the
degree to which it will help Romania to break out of its isolation and become a part of
mainstream  Europe.  Reconciliation  with  a  historic  rival  still  remains  a  means  to  a
different  end rather  than being  an  overriding  goal  in  itself.  This  was  shown in  the
summer and autumn of 1997 when Romania's bids to be included in negotiations for the
enlargement of both NATO and the EU were rejected.  Scepticism about the ability to
preserve good links with Hungary grew and enthusiasm for building bridges with the
Hungarian minority diminished.  Old disputes concerning the rights of  the Hungarian
minority quickly resurfaced and it was not just nationalists on the Romanian side who
were ready to make difficulties.
63 If  Romania  and  Hungary  find  themselves  on  different  sides  of  a  new  security  line
cordoning off the Balkans from the rest of Europe, it will not be easy to preserve the
much-vaunted security partnership that ministers from both countries have claimed now
exists. Neither will Romania's efforts to pass from the communist and post-communist
era (1946-1996) to a liberal democratic one be easily accomplished if it finds itself out or,
a limb in an uncertain security environment.
64 Romanian-Hungarian relations at inter-state and inter-communal level are still  at the
mercy of shifting events. But at least ethnic tensions on the ground shows little sign of
resurfacing.  A  poll  carried  out  in  Romania  in  August  1997  found  that  only  5 %  of
respondents answered yes to the question, « is there likely to be inter-ethnic conflict in
your locality in the near future ? »60.
65 But it remains true that majorities are less inclined to make concessions to minorities
when their own economic prospects are bleak. In hard times, demagogues who insist that
minority rights are a violation of national sovereignty will always find a more receptive
audience than in times of economic contentment. Romania after 1996 offers a fascinating
example of a society facing massive economic hardships whose government is seeking
simultaneously to address minority concerns. This is a very delicate balancing-act and it
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is  not clear at the time of writing whether ruling reformers will  be able to combine
austerity policies and liberal minority ones without paying a high political price.
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ABSTRACTS
The terrible nature of events in the former Yugoslavia have obscured a long-running quarrel
between Romania and Hungary which strengthened the forces of radical nationalism in both
countries.  In many ways,  the Romanian-Hungarian dispute is the paradigm case of  an inter-
ethnic dispute in Eastern Europe. 
Nonetheless,  Romania and Hungary have signed a treaty of friendship which it  is  hoped will
inaugurate  a  period of  lasting  stability  between two historic  rivals.  The author  analyses  the
changing conditions which have enabled two formerly intractable neighbours to put aside their
quarrels  and  it  examines  the  obstacles  that  need  to  be  overcome  before  a  process  of
reconciliation  can hope to  be  consolidated.  Romanian-Hungarian relations  at  inter-state  and
inter-communal level are still at the mercy of shifting events.
La nature terrible des événements dans l’ancienne Yougoslavie ont masqué une vieille querelle
entre la Roumanie et la Hongrie qui a renforcé les forces nationalistes dans les deux pays. La
dispute  roumano-hongroise  représente,  sous  de  multiples  formes,  le  paradigme  des  rivalités
interthniques en Europe de l’Est.
Néanmoins, les deux pays ont signé un traité d’amitié, dont on espère qu’il inaugure une longue
période  de  stabilité  entre  deux  rivaux  historiques.  L’auteur  analyse  les  changements  de
conditions qui ont permis à deux anciens voisins intraitables de mettre de côté leurs querelles. Il
passe  en  revue  les  obstacles  devant  être  surmontés  avant  qu’un  processus  de  réconciliation
puisse être consolidé. Les relations roumano-hongroises, interétatiques et intercommunautaires,
n’en demeurent pas moins instables.
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